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THE JUS AD BELLUM AND ENTITIES SHORT OF STATEHOOD
IN THE REPORT ON THE CONFLICT IN GEORGIA
I. INTRODUCTION
On 2 December 2008 the Council of the European Union took the decision to establish
an Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia
(IIFFMCG) which had occurred in August of that year.1 The Mission conducted visits
and meetings and received correspondence from all four entities involved in the con-
flict.2 It was able to call on the guidance and advice of an advisory board of politicians
and senior civil servants, as well as on the expertise of military and legal experts,
historians and political analysts.3 On 30 September 2009, just over a year after the
tensions in the Caucasus boiled over into a high-intensity armed conflict, the Mission
published its report.4 The report is significant because, as it correctly noted:
This is the first time in its history that the European Union has decided to intervene actively
in a serious armed conflict. It is also the first time that after having reached a ceasefire
agreement the European Union set up a Fact-Finding Mission as a political and diplomatic
follow-up to the conflict.5
However, whilst it labeled itself a ‘fact-finding mission’, IIFFMCG’s remit went be-
yond simply investigating ‘the origins and the course of the conflict in Georgia’.6 The
Mission was additionally charged with assessing these facts ‘with regard to inter-
national law. . ., humanitarian law and human rights, and the accusations made in that
context’.7 Thus, whilst the report was keen to stress ‘that the Fact-Finding Mission is
strictly limited to establishing facts and is not a tribunal’,8 there was an inherent con-
tradiction in what it set out to do and, ultimately, the 1100-page ‘fact-finding’ report
ended up casting judgment on the lawfulness of many of the issues that arose from that
conflict. Given that it would seem unlikely that the legal issues addressed in the report
will ever be examined by the International Court of Justice (ICJ)9 or any other inter-
national tribunal, the legal determinations therein are potentially significant.
Whilst the report offered a comprehensive background to the events that erupted
on 7/8 August 2008, and presented its conclusions as to violations of international
1 EU Council Decision 2008/901/CFSP of 2 December 2008 concerning an independent
international fact-finding mission on the conflict in Georgia, [2008] OJ 323/66.
2 The Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia
(IIFFMCG), 30 December 2009, all three volumes at http://www.ceiig.ch/Report.html, see
Volume I, 39–43. 3 ibid. 4 ibid.
5 ibid 2. 6 EU Council Decision (n 1) art 1(2).
7 ibid. This phraseology is odd, as it implies that international humanitarian law and inter-
national human rights law are not part of international law.
8 IIFFMCG Report, Volume I (n 2) 2.
9 Of course, the ICJ does have a contentious case relating to the conflict on its docket, but this
application is jurisdictionally based upon the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD). As the Court pointed out in its provisional measures
order, it is required to ‘confine its examination...to those [matters] which appear to fall within the
scope of CERD.’ See the Case Concerning the Application of the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation) (Request for
the Indication of Provisional Measures Order) [2008], http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/140/
14801.pdf para 127.
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humanitarian law and international human rights law,10 it was its assessment of the
lawfulness of the use of force by all of the parties involved in the conflict that was
perhaps the most notable. This was not least because of the factual confusion that
existed over the initial stages of the conflict, including what measures of force were
employed, when and by whom.11 Indeed, on the day of the publication of the report it
was the jus ad bellum issues that made the headlines.12
The aim of this short article is not to offer an assessment of the lawfulness of the
actions of the parties concerned.13 Neither is it to give a full summary of the findings of
the Mission, either generally or with regard to use of force issues specifically. Indeed, it
is worth noting that there are a number of aspects of IIFFMCG’s treatment of jus ad
bellum issues that are worth further consideration,14 but these will not be discussed
here. These issues will necessarily be left for others to examine. The sole aim of this
piece is to offer some comments on the single most important conclusion of the report,
and the one that significantly altered the way in which the Mission carried out its
analysis on the use of force issues. That is, the applicability of the jus ad bellum to
entities short of statehood.15
10 See, in general, IIFFMCG Report, Volume II (n 2).
11 One notable example is that Georgia claimed that the Russian intervention into Georgian
territory began on the 7 August 2008 (see M Saakashvili, ‘Georgia Acted in Self-Defence’ Wall
Street Journal, 2 December 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122817723737570713.html),
whereas Russia maintained this did not occur until the following day (see UN Doc S/2008/545).
Indeed, the conflict was one that was clouded in a great deal of factual disagreement, propaganda,
and media misdirection. This is to an extent true with regard to all conflicts, but this was a
problem that was particularly pronounced in the case of the Russia/Georgia dispute. Furthermore,
as the Report noted, this problem was exacerbated by the technological disruption of so-called
‘cyber-attacks’, which affected all parties and led to the disruption and occasional collapse of
servers in the region. See IIFFMCG Report, Volume II (n 2) 117–119.
12 See, for example, ‘Uncomfortable Conclusions for Georgia’ BBC News Online,
30 September 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/8284046.stm.
13 For a detailed legal assessment of various aspects of the conflict see JA Green and CPM
Waters (eds), Conflict in the Caucasus: Implications for International Legal Order (Palgrave,
Basingstoke, forthcoming 2010). See also NN Petro, ‘The Legal Case for Russian Intervention in
Georgia’ (2009) 32 Fordham Int’l LJ 1524; A Nu berger, ‘The War between Russia and
Georgia—Consequences and Unresolved Questions’ (2009) 1 Go¨ttingen J Int’l L 341, 359–360;
C King, ‘The Five Day War: Managing Moscow After the Georgia Crisis’ (2008) 87 Foreign Aff
2; NM Shanahan Cutts, ‘Enemies Through the Gates: Russian Violations of International Law in
the Georgia/Abkhazia Conflict’ (2007–2009) 40 Case W Res J Int’l L 281, 302–304; and M Iqbal
and S Hassan, ‘Armed and Ready’ (2008) 158 New LJ 1277.
14 For example, the Mission’s treatment of the criteria of necessity and proportionality in the
context of self-defence was cursory and arguably inconsistent with customary international law
(cf IIFFMCG Report, Volume II (n 2) 269–274 to J Gardam, Necessity, Proportionality and the
Use of Force by States (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004) 138–187; and JA Green,
The International Court of Justice and Self-Defence in International Law (Hart Publishing,
Oxford, 2009) 63–109. Other jus ad bellum issues in the Report that are potentially of concern
include: reference to a seemingly new concept of ‘formal’ reporting of actions of self-defence to
the UN Security Council, the treatment of the notion of ‘reprisals’ and the ‘accumulation of
events’ theory in the context of self-defence.
15 It is worth noting that the Mission made it clear that the comparatively short Volume I of the
Report should be viewed as authoritative (IIFFMCG Report, Volume II (n 2) 1). Much of the
analysis herein relates to Volume II. However, the two volumes do not contradict each other, and
Volume I is drawn from the findings set out in Volume II. Ultimately, Volume II still represents
the published conclusions of the Mission and is therefore equally worthy of analysis.
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II. THE APPLICABILITY OF THE JUS AD BELLUM TO ENTITIES SHORT OF STATEHOOD
Despite the fact that the jus ad bellum is a notoriously uncertain area of international
law, its applicability to the forcible actions of States—particularly the applicability of
its fundamental provisions in the United Nations (UN) Charter: Article 2(4) and
Chapter VII—is uncontroversial.16 Of course, one might well dispute the specific
application of the law in any given case, but its applicability to States in the first
instance is clear. Thus, here, the fact that jus ad bellum governs the respective uses of
military force—and, indeed, the preceding threats of military force—by Russia and
Georgia is not worthy of further comment.
However, in analysing the use of force in the context of the Caucasus conflict, the
Mission for the most part took the view that the legal regime of the jus ad bellum was
applicable in its entirety to the forcible actions of all of the entities involved—to Russia
and Georgia as states, but also to South Ossetia (categorized in the Report as ‘an entity
short of statehood’)17 and Abkhazia (which was viewed as ‘a state-like entity’).18
Such a wholesale application of the law on the use of force to entities that are not
states is, at the very least, highly controversial.19 This is not to say that the application
of the jus ad bellum to non-State entities is necessarily always incorrect, at least when
the law on the use of force is taken as constituting more than just the general prohi-
bition of the use of force enshrined in article 2(4), only that such an approach is far from
being as free from controversy as the Report implied. Perhaps more important, then, is
the fact that IIFFMCG’s reasoning for this approach was neither clear nor consistent.
A. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter
In applying the jus ad bellum to the non-State entities involved in the conflict, the
Report began by referencing article 2(4). This provision as it appears in the UN Charter
reads as follows:
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.20
Before addressing any issue of applicability, the first point of concern here is the fact
that the Report misquoted article 2(4). It stated that ‘[u]nder article 2(4) of the UN
Charter, the use of force is prohibited only if it is directed against “the sovereignty,
territorial integrity or political independence of another state”, or if it is “in any other
manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.”’21 There is no mention of
16 As Gray remarks, ‘The provisions in Articles 2(4) and 51. . .are accordingly directed to
inter-state conflict.’ See C Gray, International Law and the Use of Force (3rd edn, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 2008) 7.
17 IIFFMCG Report, Volume II (n 2) 229. 18 ibid.
19 The generally accepted view is that ‘[t]he UN Charter, and jus ad bellum generally, only
deals with conflicts between States. It treats internal disputes, even those involving secessionist
enclaves like South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as a domestic matter,’ A Dworkin, ‘The Georgian
Conflict and International Law’ (2008) Crimes of War Project, http://www.crimesofwar.org/
onnews/news-georgia.html. However, for the minority contrary view as to the applicability of art
2(4) to non-State entities, see T Gazzini, The Changing Rules on the Use of Force in International
Law (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2005) 180–181.
20 UN Charter, art 2(4). 21 IIFFMCG Report, Volume II (n 2) 239.
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‘sovereignty’ in that provision.22 Moreover, this article of the Charter refers to the
purposes of the UN, and not the ‘Charter’ of the UN as the Report indicates. This is
perhaps a relatively minor point, in that the meaning of article 2(4) was essentially
preserved. Having said this, it is hardly reassuring that, in a Report of this kind, the core
provision of the law in this area was incorrectly stated, especially when this was
presented as a direct quote and was compounded by repetition.23
The report then proceeded to submit that the prohibition on the use of force should
be applied to South Ossetia. Yet, the prohibition on the use of force, as found in article
2(4), is clearly addressed to ‘states’. In fact, not only is article 2(4) addressed to states,
it is also explicit in prohibiting the use of force in the ‘international relations’ of States.
This would further indicate that the use of force employed as part of a state’s ‘internal
relations’—such as an attack on a non-State entity existing within the State—would
not be prohibited by article 2(4). Or, as Dinstein has put this, ‘[i]ntra-state clashes
therefore are out of reach of the Charter’s provision.’24
Irrespective of this apparent inapplicability of article 2(4) to forcible actions taken
by or against South Ossetia or Abkhazia, the Mission took the view that ‘[i]n the
Georgian-South Ossetian conflict, the use of force is “inconsistent with the Charter of
the United Nations [sic]”, and therefore the prohibition of the use of force is applicable
to the conflict. . .’25 Of course, the use of force in the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict
was almost certainly not consistent with the Charter of the UN broadly defined (or the
purposes of the UN, somewhat more specifically—not to mention more accurately—
defined), given the organization’s penchant for the peaceful settlement of disputes and
the non-use of force.26
However, this in itself is a somewhat flimsy basis for arguing that article 2(4) is
applicable to non-State entities. The report expands upon this assertion on the basis that
the prohibition on the use of force is referred to in three separate peace agreements
made between various different groupings of Georgia, Russia, South Ossetia, North
Ossetia and Abkhazia.27 Whilst the prohibition of the use of force is indeed mentioned
22 Art 2(4) also prohibits the threat or use of force against ‘any State’, not ‘another State’ as the
Report indicates.
23 Indeed, the misquotation of art 2(4) is not the only basic error of this kind in the Report
(though it is perhaps the most concerning). For example, the Report referred to the prominent
international legal scholar (and specialist on the jus ad bellum), Professor Christine Gray, as
‘Susan Gray’. See IIFFMCG Report, Volume II (n 2) 255.
24 Y Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence (4th edn, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 2005) 85.
25 IIFFMCG Report, Volume II (n 2) 239–240.
26 As is stressed, in particular, in arts 2(3) and 2(4) of the UN Charter.
27 IIFFMCG Report, Volume II (n 2) 240–241. These agreements are: ‘The Agreement on
Principles of Settlement of the Georgian-Ossetia Conflict’ of 24 June 1992 (the so-called ‘Sochi
Agreement’); ‘The Agreement on the Further Development on the Process of the Peaceful
Regulation of the Georgia-Ossetian Conflict and on the Joint Control Commission’ of 31 October
1994; and ‘The Memorandum on Necessary Measures to be Undertaken in Order to Ensure
Security and Strengthening of Mutual Trust between the Parties to the Georgian-Ossetian
Conflict’ of 1996. All three documents can be found in T Diasamidze, Regional Conflicts in
Georgia (The Autonomous Oblast of South Ossetia, The Autonomous SSR of Abkhazia 1989–
2008): The Collection of Political-Legal Acts (Regionalism Research Centre, Tbilisi, 2nd edn,
2008) 110, 192 and 244 respectively.
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explicitly in two of these three documents28 (and is inherently implicit in the third),29
article 2(4) itself is not expressly mentioned in any of them.
Nevertheless, the Mission seemed sure that ‘[d]espite the differing status of the
parties to the conflict (Georgia as a state, South Ossetia as an entity short of statehood
and legally a part of Georgia), the prohibition of the use of force as endorsed in the UN
Charter applies to their relations.’30 This is, as we have noted, at best debatable and the
support for this contention in the Report is weak.
For example, IIFFMCG placed a great deal of weight on the fact that the preamble
of the 1992 Sochi Agreement reaffirms ‘the commitment to the UN Charter and the
Helsinki Final Act.’31 Indeed, it is concluded that ‘[t]his clause is a clear indication that
Georgia accepts the applicability of the prohibition of the use of force in its conflict
with South Ossetia.’32 Furthermore, the Report goes on to state that ‘[t]he reference to
the UN Charter would not make any sense if it did not include the prohibition of the use
of force, as this is the centrepiece of the Charter.’33 Yet, this seems an illogical con-
clusion. There would be no need, in any of the three peace agreements, for an express
denunciation of the use of force if article 2(4) was in fact applicable. In such a case,
article 2(4) would, in and of itself, act as a restriction of the use of force against or by a
non-State entity.
It is not uncommon for various international instruments to call for the non-use of
force between different entities.34 It does not follow from this, however, that a
wholesale incorporation of the prohibition of the use of force that applies between
states is what is being alluded to in such instruments. References to abstinence from
forcible action of this kind may well be intended to reaffirm article 2(4), but they may
equally be used instead of it because it does not apply. In the case of the Caucasus
conflict, all that the three agreements noted by the Report indicate is that the parties
have pledged not to use force in solving this crisis, nothing more.
The simple fact that the various entities involved in this dispute (or set of disputes)
have agreed not to use force against each other does not constitute an incorporation of
article 2(4) into these agreements. Nor does it hold as a basis for the conclusion that
this provision is applicable to non-State entities. It should be recalled that article 2(4) is
a treaty provision between the member states of the UN and is recognized as being
applicable in customary international law to the international relations of non-party
states.35 The various uses of force in the Caucasus by or against non-State entities
may well breach the provisions of the agreements between them (and between them
and State parties) that pledge to maintain peaceful relations, but this does not
correspond to a breach of article 2(4). This is particularly true when it is considered,
28 That is, in the 1994 Agreement and the 1996 Memorandum, ibid.
29 That is, in the 1992 Agreement (n 27).
30 IIFFMCG Report, Volume II (n 2) 242, emphasis added.
31 ibid 240. 32 ibid. 33 ibid.
34 UN Security Council Resolutions act as a good illustration of this point. Take, as just one
example, Resolution 1701, UN Doc S/RES/1701 (2006), which called for—amongst other
things—the ‘immediate cessation by Hezbollah of all attacks’.
35 Gray (n 16) 8. This is also implicit in the conclusions as to the customary international law
status of Article 2(4) drawn by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case (as well as in the views of the parties
to that dispute on this issue). See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. United States of America) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14 paras 187–188.
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as has already been noted, that this provision (and its corresponding customary
international law manifestation) is directed at the use of force between ‘states’ in the
technical sense.36
B. The Definition of Aggression
All of this is not to say that the jus ad bellum is necessarily inapplicable to non-State
entities in its entirety. In contrast to the application of article 2(4), forcible actions by
or against South Ossetia (or Abkhazia) were arguably contrary to article 3(d) of the
1974 Definition of Aggression, which holds that an ‘attack by the armed forces of a
state on the land, sea or air forces, or marine or air fleets of another state’ constitutes an
unlawful act of aggression.37 This is on the basis that article 1 of that instrument
indicates that the term ‘state’ is used therein without prejudice to issues of recognition
or membership of the UN.38 As such, the de facto ‘State like’ qualities of South Ossetia
or Abkhazia would mean that the prohibition of acts of ‘aggression’ would apply as
much to those entities as to Russia or Georgia. Of course, the Definition of Aggression
is not binding in itself, but the ICJ has indicated that at least some of its provisions are
representative of customary international law.39
The Report missed this key distinction between the meaning of ‘state’ in the UN
Charter and the meaning of the same term in the Definition of Aggression. Indeed,
when it did apply the Definition of Aggression to the actions of Georgia against South
Ossetia on 7/8 August 2008, the Report simply noted that these actions ‘were not
directed against the territory of “another state”, but against the territory of an entity
short of statehood outside the jurisdiction of the attacking state. But as argued above,
the prohibition of the use of force applies here as well.’40 This completely misses the
point that the attacks against South Ossetia were in all likelihood attacks against a
‘State’ for the purposes of the Definition of Aggression. Instead, the dubious con-
clusion as to the applicability of the general prohibition on the use of military force was
simply reiterated.
C. Article 51 of the UN Charter
The Mission went further than holding that article 2(4) of the UN Charter was appli-
cable to non-State entities. It also took the view article 51 of the same treaty, the
Charter provision governing self-defence, was similarly applicable in noting that its
finding regarding article 2(4) ‘guides not only the applicability of Art 2(4), but also of
Art 51 of the UN Charter.’41
The reasoning provided by IIFFMCG for this controversial contention was that:
According to the wording of Art 51, this provision applies only to UN member states. Yet,
if the use of force is prohibited in the relations between a state and an entity short of
statehood, then self-defence must be available to both sides as well. The scope of both rules
36 Dworkin (n 19).
37 Definition of Aggression, annexed to GA Res 3314, 1974.
38 This point is made, with relation to South Ossetia, by Petro (n 13) 1526–1528.
39 Nicaragua (Merits) (n 35) para 195.
40 IIFFMCG Report, Volume II (n 2) 243.
41 IIFFMCG Report, Volume II (n 2) 241.
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ratione personae must be identical, because otherwise the regime of the use of force would
not be coherent. This means that self-defence is admissible also for an entity short of
statehood.42
The casual and cursory manner in which the Report stated this conclusion is startling
and should not go unchallenged. Whether non-State entities have the right to self-
defence under international law is a largely unexplored and controversial issue.43 The
Mission failed to even acknowledge this fact when it set out this claim. It is only much
later in the Report that it briefly alluded to the controversy, stating that: ‘[e]ven if self-
defence by an entity short of statehood were allowed (which is highly controversial, as
shown above).’44
Unfortunately, the Report did not elucidate this controversy as it claimed. If any-
thing, it simply implied, uncritically, that entities short of statehood are entitled to
invoke the right of self-defence where there has been a call for the abstinence of force
by both sides. It is this fact—that the Report did not offer any further explanation for
the applicability of self-defence beyond its traditional ‘State-based’ nature—that is
most concerning here. Admittedly, there is a degree of logic to the Report’s argument.
If one accepts the applicability of article 2(4) to non-State entities, a corresponding
application of article 51 of the UN Charter would make a degree of theoretical sense.
Yet such a theoretical leap—however logical—is not a substitute for the identification
of a positive legal basis for such an application of self-defence. Article 51, much like
article 2(4), is clear that it applies to states, or specifically to armed attacks ‘against a
Member of the United Nations.’45
D. Specific Problems with the Report’s Application of the jus ad bellum
to Non-State Entities
By concluding that articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter were applicable to
South Ossetia and Abkhazia as well as to Georgia and Russia, the Mission created a
variety of problems for itself when it actually came to attempting such an application.
The Report had to proceed by stretching the analogy it had drawn between ‘State-
like’ entities and an actual state. For example, it took the view that ‘[b]ecause the
Georgian villages attacked by South Ossetian forces were not under the jurisdiction of
South Ossetia before 8 August 2008, the actions by the South Ossetian militia are
equivalent to an attack on the “territory of another State”.’46 Such a conclusion again
42 ibid 241–242.
43 The traditional view is that ‘[a]ccording to the law of nations, a state is an entity that is
allowed to defend itself.’ Self-defence is therefore triggered when ‘a state (and not a group of
people) is physically attacked. . .’, P Cliteur, ‘Self-Defence and Terrorism’ in A Eyffinger, A
Stephens and S Muller (eds), Self-Defence as a Fundamental Principle (Hague Academic Press,
The Hague, 2009) 83 and 86 respectively (emphasis in original). Although there is a growing
body of practice and literature suggesting the possibility of a non-State entity perpetrating an
armed attack against a State and therefore triggering the right of self-defence (see n 49), there has
been little discussion as to whether such an entity possesses the right of self-defence itself.
44 IIFFMCG Report, Volume II (n 2) 281. 45 UN Charter, art 51.
46 IIFFMCG Report, Volume II (n 2) 244.
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logically flows from the starting point of the applicability of article 2(4), but it would
seem to be difficult to reconcile with the accepted approach taken by international
law.47
Furthermore, the Report went on to say that ‘[t]hese acts were serious and surpassed
a threshold of gravity and therefore also constituted an “armed attack” in terms of Art
51 of the UN Charter.’48 Such a claim is factually debatable in the first instance, and is
also cursory in a legal sense (given that the ‘gravity threshold’ for an armed attack is
far from clear).49 More importantly, though, this again assumes that a non-State entity
can commit an armed attack at all. This is perhaps arguably the case, given current
trends in State practice,50 but it is far from certain.51
Similarly, cracks in this apparent application of the jus ad bellum are also visible
when the Report addressed the issue of Russia’s right to the collective self-defence
of South Ossetia. Here, the Report again asserted that ‘[t]he right to individual self-
defence is a necessary counterpart to the prohibition on the use of force. If South
Ossetia is bound to refrain from the use of force, it must in consequence also be entitled
to defend itself.’52 However, it then went on to acknowledge that a right of collective
self-defence in aid of a non-State entity would lead to complications. In particular, the
Report noted that ‘[i]ndividual self-defence and collective self-defence are not logi-
cally linked, especially where the right to individual self-defence flows, as here, not
unequivocally from Charter law or customary law, but mainly or even exclusively from
the special treaties between the sides.’53 This is interesting not least because it amounts
47 It would seem relatively clear that attacks by non-State entities operating from within the
State do not engage the jus ad bellum, but instead are manifestations of an internal armed conflict.
For example, the ICJ stated in the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion) [2004] ICJ Rep 135 para 139 that ‘Israel
exercises control in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and . . . as Israel itself states, the threat
which it regards as justifying the construction of the wall originates within, and not outside, that
territory.’ As such, the Court viewed the jus ad bellum as being inapplicable to that threat. See
also Dinstein (n 24) 204–205.
48 IIFFMCG Report, Volume II (n 2) 244.
49 Green (n 14) 31–42; and Gray (n 16) 147–148.
50 There is a growing trend in State practice that suggests that an armed attack (triggering self-
defence) may emanate from a non-State actor. Examples include the 2001 intervention in
Afghanistan, taken in response to an attack perpetrated by a non-State terrorist group and Israeli
action against Hezbollah in 2006. For detailed discussion of these examples in this context, see
Green ibid 156–159. It is worth noting that these two examples are probably not enough in
themselves to constitute a change in customary international law with regard to non-State ‘armed
attacks’, but they certainly indicate the beginning of a paradigm shift in that direction, see M
Byers, ‘Terrorism, the Use of Force and International Law After 11 September’ (2002) 51 Int’l &
Comp L Q 401, 407–409.
51 For example, the ICJ has appeared to indicate that an armed attack must stem from a State.
See Israeli Wall (Advisory Opinion) (n 47) para 139, where the Court stated that ‘Article 51 of the
Charter thus recognizes the existence of an inherent right of self-defence in the case of armed
attack by one State against another State’ (emphasis added). See also: I Scobbie, ‘Words
My Mother Never Taught Me: In Defence of the International Court’ (2005) 99 Am J Int’l L 76,
80–81; and Gazzini (n 19) 184–191.
52 IIFFMCG Report, Volume II (n 2) 282. 53 ibid 282.
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to IIFFMCG acknowledging that its basis for applying the jus ad bellum in this context
was weak.
Of course, the inapplicability of the right of Russia to invoke the right of collective
self-defence in support of South Ossetia must be correct. Any such precedent would be
extremely damaging to international peace and security. States could forcibly aid any
entity that requested help; the scope for the (increased) abuse of the right of self-
defence would be huge. However, the decision of the Mission to apply the jus ad
bellum, and in particular article 51, to South Ossetia left it with the difficult task of
having to artificially distinguish between individual self-defence (applicable to non-
State entities) and collective self-defence (which is necessarily inapplicable to them).
The Report defended such a distinction on the basis that ‘[i]t is not inconsistent to
allow an entity short of statehood to defend itself against armed attacks, while at the
same time limiting its right to “invite” foreign support.’54
Yet to grant the right of individual self-defence whilst denying the right of collective
self-defence is surely inconsistent. These two manifestations of self-defence are clearly
linked in article 51. Such logic leads to the bizarre (not to mention confusing) con-
clusion that some of article 51 applies to non-State entities, but not all of it. Moreover,
there are practical problems with such an approach. For example, let us adopt the
argument that collective self-defence exists to give weak states the possibility of being
defended from attacks by much stronger states: take the archetypal case of Kuwait
being attacked by Iraq in August 1990. In such cases, denying the right of collective
self-defence to a weak State almost makes providing such a State with the right to
individual self-defence useless in practice.55
This problem is even more pronounced when the ‘weak State’ is not in fact a State at
all, but a non-State entity. After all, a ‘State like’ entity is probably going to be even
‘weaker’ than a weak State. On most occasions such an entity would not be able to
defend itself adequately against the organized armed forces of a State. Indeed, this
would seem relatively clear from the conflict in the Caucasus, where South Ossetia’s
resistance to the Georgian offensive was largely ineffectual until Russian support
appeared.
Interestingly, the Report notes that ‘the use of force by secessionist groups is any
case illegal under international law, even assuming that a right to secede exists. The
general rule is that South Ossetian authorities and armed forces were not themselves
entitled to use force in order to attain self-determination.’56 This conclusion would
seem correct, but it ignores the fact that it is at least arguable that all of the uses of
force by South Ossetia against Georgia were targeted towards the ultimate goal of
secession. As such, the prohibition of the use of force as mentioned in the various
agreements relied upon by the Mission could be viewed as a reference to force em-
ployed in this context, rather than a reference to article 2(4). If one were to accept this,
54 ibid.
55 cf the views expressed by Judge Schwebel in his dissenting opinion to the Nicaragua case,
with regard to the Court’s limitation of its ‘proportionate countermeasures’ concept to individual
defensive responses only. His objection was similarly based on the position that ‘weak’ States
may not be able to defend themselves without collective support. See Nicaragua (Merits) (n 35)
dissenting opinion of Judge Schwebel para 177.
56 IIFFMCG Report, Volume II (n 2) 279.
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then the right of self-defence as encompassed in article 51 would similarly not be
applicable.
III. CONCLUSION
This comment has offered criticism of a specific issue that arises from the Report of the
Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia. Indeed, it
has been argued that the Mission’s blanket application of article 2(4) and 51 of the UN
Charter to the actions of, and actions taken against, the two non-State entities involved
in the conflict—South Ossetia and Georgia—was flawed. This is both because of the
dubious conceptual coherence of such a conclusion and because of the practical diffi-
culties associated with in fact applying these core provisions of the jus ad bellum to
non-State entities.
However, perhaps more concerning than the conclusion of IIFFMCG in this regard
was the fact that the controversial aspects of this approach went virtually unacknowl-
edged, and that these stark legal conclusions were reached in such a cursory and
uncritical manner. Although, as noted above, this comment does not seek to examine
the Mission’s Report in general, or even to offer a comprehensive critique of its use of
force aspects, it is worth pointing to the fact that the confused and ultimately inad-
equate approach to the applicability of the jus ad bellum can be seen as stemming, at
least in part, from a relatively superficial methodological approach to international law.
For example, the Report based too many of its conclusions throughout on the juris-
prudence and doctrine of scholarly opinion and the ICJ, as opposed to the practice of
states. Indeed, while there were many references to ‘state practice’ to support the
positions adopted by the Mission, there were also extremely few instances where actual
examples of such practice were drawn upon in support of the contentions made.
This kind of ‘brushstrokes’ approach to international law is surely undesirable,
particularly given the de facto importance of the Report. Whilst the Mission made it
clear it was not a tribunal, it was still required as part of its mandate to address the facts
under international law.
Returning to the specific issue discussed here, it would seem that instead of sys-
tematically ascertaining and applying international law to the conflict, the Mission took
a prescriptive step, and confused the desirable development of the law with its current
content. It is certainly possible to argue that there is merit to the Report’s view that
article 2(4) should restrict the actions of non-State entities, as well as actions taken
against them, and that as a corollary to this, non-State entities should be able to act in
self-defence. As a policy matter, it is desirable for states to be restricted directly under
the key provisions of the jus ad bellum from attacking other entities, be they States or
not. Similarly, providing such entities with rights (the lawful right to defend them-
selves) and duties (the obligation not to attack) under the jus ad bellum is appealing.
However, it is very difficult to conclude that this is part of the existing lex lata.
Instead, perhaps, it may be suggested that the application of the jus ad bellum to non-
State entities is aspirational, or, at best, an emerging principle of lex ferenda. Any
arguments to make the law more ‘coherent’, whilst welcome, need to be pronounced as
lex ferenda and have no place in a Report of this nature. Importantly, applying the rules
to these entities would mean a large conceptual and practical shift in the legal regime
of the jus ad bellum. Any such process would need careful consideration; the ramifi-
cations could be great. The system as it stands is not able coherently to cope with the
10 International and Comparative Law Quarterly
applicability of the core provisions of the jus ad bellum to non-State entities, as we
have seen (for example, with regard to collective self-defence). It must therefore be
concluded that the Report’s approach to the jus ad bellum in this context is extremely
concerning, largely because of its failure to acknowledge the controversial aspects of
what it set out, or the possible consequences of such a shift.
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